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Abstract. We present a generalized version of the knapsack protocol pro-
posed by D. Naccache and J. Stern at the Proceedings of Eurocrypt (1997).
Our new framework will allow the construction of other knapsack protocols
having similar security features. We will outline a very concrete example of
a new protocol using extension fields of a finite field of small characteristic
instead of the prime field Z/pZ, but more efficient in terms of computational
costs for asymptotically equal information rate and similar key size.
1. Introduction
Building new asymmetric encryption schemes has always been one of the main
goals of cryptographers. After the idea of public key cryptography was presented
in [2], only few more public key encryption schemes were developed such as the
RSA [15], the El Gamal [3], the McEliece cryptosystem [10], the NTRU [6] or the
HFE [14] (for an overview [5, 17]). Some new ideas for building new cryptographic
schemes based on semigroup actions can also be found in [9], while in the context
of knapsack quantum cryptographic schemes we refer for instance to [13]. What
D. Naccache and J. Stern built in [12] was a proposal for an asymmetric protocol
(NSK) following the earlier ideas of Morii and Kasahara in [11], further developed
by Kasahara et al. in [7, 8]. The NSK protocol consists of a shuﬄing modulo p of an
easy problem over the integers, i.e. the factorization of a composite integer where
the prime factors are chosen among a fixed set of small size. Given p a prime and
Z/pZ the finite field of remainder classes, the NSK protocol is based on the unique
factorization property of Z, which guarantees the uniqueness of the encryption.
This approach can be generalized to the case of multiplicative monoids (Section
2), and the NSK protocol is just a particular instance for the monoid (Z, ·) of the
general framework (subsection 2.1). Using this new general setting we are able to
construct an analogous of the NSK protocol relying on the unique factorization
properties of Fq[x], instead of Z, where Fq is the finite field of order q (Section
3). The security of our particular proposal will rely on the arithmetic structure
of the finite field Fq[x]/(h(x)) for some h(x) ∈ Fq[x], irreducible of suitable degree
(instead of the finite field of remainder classes Z/pZ). One of the main advantages
of this kind of setting is that the security is based on an exponentiation over a
finite field in such a way that it will be unfeasible for an attacker even to set up a
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discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Indeed, as we will show in the following, since
the optimal version of the NSK protocol requires that the chosen prime be next to∏
i pi, the factorization of p−j for some small j could allow for a reduction to a DLP.
In our case, instead, we choose a set of irreducible polynomials and fix the degree
of the reducing polynomial. By doing so there is no information leakage. Our new
structural conditions will be related only to the degree of the carrier polynomials
used for the encryption, avoiding any kind of DLP reduction.
In subsection 3.2.3 some issues concerning the security of the protocol will be
addressed, in particular to avoid subgroup attacks, that could possibly lead to infor-
mation.
This new setting will lead to some advantages in terms of computational costs of
encryption and decryption. In fact, arithmetics over finite fields Fqm is considered
to be preferrable than arithmetics over Zp when p ' qm and q  p in terms of
computations. We will analyse the key features of our protocol, such as the number
of parameters involved for the setting up of the public key, and this will allow us to
show a greater deal of flexibility, in comparison with the NSK protocol.
In subsection 3.2.2 we will analise the asymptotics of the information rate of
our protocol, showing that it is equal to that of [12]. An exact formula for the
information rate will also be provided.
As a subproduct, we present in Section 3.3 a variation of the polynomial protocol
where the irreducibility of h(x) is dropped. The encryption is performed over a
suitable direct sum of fields, and a decryption is available thanks to the Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
2. The new class
In this section we will present a generalized version of the protocol presented in
[12].
Let S be a monoid and ∼ a finite index congruence on S. We will denote the
class of an element s ∈ S with respect to ∼ as [s].
Definition 1. A morphism ψ will be said to be ∼proper, if
• ψ : S −→ S is injective;
• ψ is compatible with ∼ (i.e. ψ(x) ∼ ψ(y) iff x ∼ y);
• the induced application ψ˜ : S/∼ −→ S/∼ is invertible.
Definition 2. Given L ∈ N we will say that S is L-cryptable under ∼ if there exists
a ∼proper morphism ψ and elements s1, . . . , sL ∈ S such that
αψ∼ : ZL2 −→ S/ ∼
m = (m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
[
L∏
i=1
ψ(si)
mi
]
is an injective application.
The following proposition will be useful later on
Proposition 1. Given a monoid S that is L-cryptable under ∼, the following maps
are also injective:
αψ : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
ψ(si)
mi
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α∼ : ZL2 −→ S/ ∼
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
[
L∏
i=1
smii
]
α : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
smii .
Proof. The proof follows by observing that, since ψ is ∼proper morphism, then also
α∼ is injective. Also αψ∼ injective implies that αψ is injective. Again, since ψ is an
injection, also α is injective.
As we have already pointed out, this properties are necessary to keep the encryp-
tion meaningful. In the following we will see how it is possible to find non trivial
examples of this construction.
Now, denote the image of any map f between sets by =(f), and consider the
following problems:
Problem 1. Given c ∈ =(αψ∼) find m such that αψ∼(m) = c.
Problem 2. Given c′ ∈ =(α∼) find m such that α∼(m) = c′.
Let now S, be an L-cryptable monoid under a congruence ∼. Whenever a given
triple (S,∼, ψ) is such that Problem 1 is difficult, Problem 2 is easy we define a
cryptosystem as follows. Let
(S,∼, L, ψ˜([s1]), . . . , ψ˜([sL]))
be the public key and
(ψ˜−1, s1, . . . , sL)
be the secret key, the main operations are given by
• Encryption: E(m) := αψ∼(m) =
∏L
i=1 ψ˜([si])
mi =: c;
• Decryption: D(c) is given by solving Problem 2 for c′ = ψ˜−1(c).
Remark 1. The reader should observe that in the definition of the protocol we did
not use the injectivity of ψ nor the fact that S/ ∼ is a quotient of a monoid S. This
is nevertheless the case in all the examples of this protocol we could find, where
Problem 2 is easy since a suitable lift to S is given. Indeed, in practical situations
the problem will be solved computing (α−1 ◦Γ)(c′) where Γ is a lift S/ ∼−→ S such
that the following diagram
Z
L
2
α //
α∼
""
=(α)
=(α∼)
Γ̂
OO
(1)
commutes when Γ̂ := Γ|=(α∼)
Remark 2. Notice that the information rate is given by L/b where b is the number
of bits that are needed to represent an element of S/ ∼
In what follows we will show how the NSK protocol fits in this rather general
framework, as well as brand new protocols involving polynomials over finite fields.
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2.1. NSK as a particular instance. In this section we will show how the
Naccache-Stern (NSK) protocol fits in our general framework, in the case S = (Z, ·).
Consider the prime ideal P = 〈p〉 generated by a prime number p ∈ Z. Let us
denote by ∼ the congruence induced by the ideal P . Such a congruence is obviously
of finite index. Let v be a positive integer with u = v−1 mod p− 1, and let
ψ : Z −→ Z
a 7−→ av.
It can be easily checked that ψ is a ∼proper morphism of Z.
Now choose L distinct prime numbers pi such that
∏L
i=1 pi < p.
Proposition 2. The map
(2)
αψ∼ : ZL2 −→ Z/pZ
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7−→
[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
]
is an injection and (Z, ·) is therefore L-cryptable under the relation induced by the
ideal generated by p.
Proof. Assume that there exist two L-tuples (m1, . . . ,mL), (n1, . . . , nL) such that
αψ∼(m1, . . . ,mL) = α
ψ
∼(n1, . . . , nL), then[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnivi
]
⇒
[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
]u
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnivi
]u
⇔
[
L∏
i=1
pmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnii
]
in Z/pZ. Since
∏L
i=1 p
mi
i and
∏L
i=1 p
ni
i are smaller than p we also have
(3)
L∏
i=1
pmii =
L∏
i=1
pnii
in the unique factorization domain Z, which implies mi = ni ∀i.
Remark 3. Notice that we are able to express equation (3) because we can always
consider the canonical representative x ∈ {0, . . . , p−1} in the remainder class mod-
ulo p. This representative is also the only representative in =(α) by construction,
and therefore we have a canonical lift satisfying (1).
Remark 4. The reader should observe that when p = t +
∏
i pi for t small, than
the information rate is maximal. Unfortunately in this case factoring p − t is easy
because p − t is pL-smooth and pL  p, and this gives informations about the
bare carriers pi’s. Indeed in this case breaking the NSK protocol is not harder
than solving the DLP for the pi’s. Nevertheless the protocol remains interesting for
additional features like [12, Section 3].
3. A polynomial version
In this section we give a version of the protocol that works over Fqd instead of
Z/pZ in such a way that qd will be of the same order of magnitude than the size p
of the field Z/pZ in the NSK but q  p. In this case the specific difficult problem
we want to rely on is the following
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Problem 3. Let F be a finite field and L ∈ N.Given y1, . . . , yL ∈ F,
α : ZL2 −→ F
α(m) =
∏
i
ymii
and c ∈ =(α), find m such that α(m) = c.
Let now k = Fq and k[x] the polynomial ring in one variable over k. Let h(x) be
an irreducible element in k[x] of degree d. Set ∼ to be the congruence associated
to the ideal H = 〈h(x)〉 generated by the irreducible polynomial h(x). An efficient
algorithm to find irreducible polynomials of fixed degree is given, for instance in
[18]. Set
S = (k[x], ·)
and
S′ := S/ ∼ = ((k[x]/H)∗, ·)
where (k[x]/H)∗ = (k[x]/H)\{0}. Fix v, u ∈ N such that gcd (v, |S′|) = gcd(v, qd−
1) = 1 and uv ≡ 1 mod |S′|. Set
ψ˜ : S′ −→ S′
[s] 7−→ [sv].
Remark 5.
• ψ˜−1 : [z] 7−→ [z]u;
• k[x]/H ∼= Fqd is again a finite field.
Let now L ∈ N such that there exist L distinct irreducible monic polynomials
p1, . . . , pL ∈ Fq[x] with the property
(4)
L∑
i=1
deg pi < d.
Notice that in the present description of the protocol there are several different
strategies to choose the polynomials; we will analyse the properties of some inter-
esting choices in the following sections.
Again, we have the encryption map.
Proposition 3. (k[x], ·) is an L cryptable monoid with the map
(5)
αψ∼ : ZL2 −→ S′
m = (m1, . . . ,mL) 7−→
[
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]
.
Proof. Definition 2 requires that the map αψ∼ be an injection. Assume
αψ∼(m1, . . . ,mL) = α
ψ
∼(n1, . . . , nL)[
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pvnii
]
.
It follows [
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]u
=
[
L∏
i=1
pvnii
]u
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L∏
i=1
pmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnii
]
where, in the last equation, we can assume no reduction has happened, since prop-
erty (4) holds. Indeed
(6)
L∏
i=1
pmii =
L∏
i=1
pnii .
Recalling that k[x] is a unique factorization domain we have mi = ni ∀i.
So our cyphered text is given by c(x) = αψ∼(m1, . . . ,mL). The explicit decryption
for this protocol is simply given by the polynomial division of the decyphered code
(c(x))u, that is to say
(7) mi = 1⇐⇒ (c(x))u = 0 mod pi(x).
Remark 6. We stress once again the fact that in obtaining equation (6) we used
the canonical lift
Γ: S/ ∼−→ S
[f(x)] 7−→ g(x)
where, for any representative l(x) ∈ [f(x)], g(x) is the remainder of the division
of l(x) by h(x) in k[x], and it is obviously independent of the choice of l(x). The
decryption is effectively performed in =(α) and the solution to Problem 2 is then
given by (α−1 ◦ Γ)(c(x)u).
The information rate I = L/deg(h) log2(q) depends on the choice of the carrier
polynomials. We will explain later how to maximise this value.
Remark 7. Once the pi’s are fixed the top information rate for this protocol is
obtained when we choose h(x) such that
(8)
L∑
i=1
deg pi = deg h− 1.
Indeed the information rate can always be maximised since it is always possible to
choose h(x) in k[x] such that (8) is satisfied (cf. Remark 4) without allowing for a
straightforward reduction to a DLP. This case will be analysed in detail in 3.2.1.
3.1. A simple example. We now give an example in which k[x] = F2[x] and the
space of messages has size 29. In order to reach a message size of 9 bits, we need
exactly 9 keys, that is to say monic irreducible polynomials in F2[x]. From finite
field theory, we know that there are exactly q monic polinomials of degree 1, and
qd − q
d
irreducible monic polynomials of prime degree d. So, for q = 2 we have two poly-
nomials of degree 1, one polynomial of degree 2, two polynomials of degree 3 and
six polynomials of degree 5. For the sake of simplicity, even if the example is non
optimal as we will explain, let us choose all the irreducible monic polynomials of
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degree 1,2 and 5, summing up to exactly 9 keys, namely:
p1 = x(9)
p2 = 1 + x(10)
p3 = 1 + x+ x
2(11)
p4 = 1 + x
2 + x5(12)
p5 = 1 + x
3 + x5(13)
p6 = 1 + x+ x
2 + x3 + x5(14)
p7 = 1 + x+ x
2 + x4 + x5(15)
p8 = 1 + x+ x
3 + x4 + x5(16)
p9 = 1 + x
2 + x3 + x4 + x5.(17)
Then, the public key h(x) must be of degree
d = deg(h(x)) =
9∑
i=1
deg(pi(x)) + 1 = 35
and irreducible. For instance we may take
(18) h(x) = 1 + x2 + x35
and set our protocol onto F235 ∼= (F2[x]/H)∗, whose order is 235 − 1 when H =
〈h(x)〉. We choose the secret key and the decryption exponent, accordingly, to be
v = 3821 and u = 25169564954, so that uv = 1 mod(235−1). Then we may publish
the 9 carrier keys pvi mod (h(x), 2):
pv1 =1 + x
2 + x4 + x10 + x12 + x18 + x22(19)
+ x23 + x24 + x26 + x27 + x29 + x32
pv2 =x+ x
3 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x10 + x12 + x13(20)
+ x17 + x20 + x21 + x22 + x24 + x28 + x30 + x32
pv3 =x+ x
4 + x5 + x7 + x13 + x20 + x22(21)
+ x28 + x29 + x30 + x31 + x32 + x33 + x34
pv4 =1 + x
2 + x3 + x4 + x11 + x14 + x15 + x17 + x18(22)
+ x19 + x20 + x21 + x24 + x28 + x30 + x34
pv5 =1 + x+ x
2 + x3 + x4 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11 + x15(23)
+ x18 + x20 + x21 + x22 + x24 + x26 + x29 + x32 + x33
pv6 =1 + x+ x
2 + x4 + x7 + x12 + x13 + x15 + x16+(24)
x18 + x21 + x22 + x23 + x24 + x30 + x34
pv7 =1 + x
4 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x15 + x19 + x28 + x30 + x32 + x33(25)
pv8 =x+ x
3 + x4 + x5 + x8 + x10 + x12 + x13 + x15 + x16(26)
+ x17 + x25 + x26 + x27 + x28 + x30
pv9 =x+ x
4 + x6 + x7 + x10 + x11 + x12 + x13 + x14 + x15 + x16(27)
+ x17 + x18 + x20 + x23 + x24 + x30 + x31 + x32 + x33.
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Suppose we want to send the message m = 111000111 ∈ Z92, we encode it into
c =
9∏
i=1
pvmii mod (h(x), 2)
= x2 + x3 + x6 + x10 + x15 + x16 + x17 + x18
+ x20 + x21 + x23 + x26 + x27 + x30 + x31 + x33 + x34.(28)
Once the message has been received, it is sufficient to take the u-th power, and
the result is as follows:
cu =
9∏
i=1
pvumii mod (h(x), 2) =
9∏
i=1
pmii
= x+ x3 + x4 + x6 + x11 + x12 + x14 + x15 + x16 + x19(29)
whose factorization yields:
(30)
Factor2(c
u) =x(1 + x)(1 + x+ x2)(1 + x+ x2 + x3 + x5)
(1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5)(1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5).
We used the factorization algorithm in this simple example because we are working
with small messages. The decryption algorithm presented in (7) is to be considered
preferential.
The information rate associated to this encryption protocol is
(31) I = L
deg(h)
=
9
35
∼= 25, 7%
with the size of the space of messages being 29.
Remark 8. A similar example is presented in [12], with 28 messages. In the cited
example the information rate is slightly higher than ours, yet comparable, but the
space of messages is smaller.
If we wanted to match the size of space of messages it would be sufficient to
remove one polynomial of degree 5, obtaining an information rate of I = 8/30 ∼
26, 7%.
Remarkably enough, as in the NSK-protocol there is apparently no key leakage,
our protocol preserves the security of the carrier keys. As a matter of fact, factoring
the cyphertext c, one gets no information whatsoever on the cleartext, as it can be
seen in the given example:
Factor2(c) = x
2
(
x4 + x3 + 1
)
(x28 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 + x20 + x18+
x17 + x15 + x14 + x12 + x11 + x10 + x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1)
Remark 9. More generally, let g(x) be the public modulus and
pvm11 p
vm2
2 · · · pvmLL ≡ c(x) mod g(x)
a cyphetext. Observe that over Fq[x] we have
P (x) = pvm11 p
vm2
2 . . . p
vmL
L = t(x)g(x) + c(x)
for some t(x) ∈ Fq[x]. Now notice that infering on the factorization of P (x) from
the data of c(x) in terms of the factor basis
{pvm11 , . . . , pvmLL }
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is the difficult problem on which the protocol relies, since the factorization of poly-
nomials behaves badly with respect to reductions modulo irreducible polynomials.
As a matter of fact, we base the security of our protocol on the randomness of the
factorization of elements in the image of the map
Γg,c : Fq[x] −→ Fq[x]
Γg,c(t(x)) = t(x)g(x) + c(x).
In general, the usual security one expects using prime numbers as carriers (NSK)
can be extended to monic irreducible polynomials.
As we already pointed out, we are using here a non-optimal setting for our
example, in that we skipped the polynomials of degree 3 and 4, and used all those
of degree 5 instead. If we decided to optimize the information rate, we could take
the two polynomials of degree 1, the single polynomial of degree 2, two of degree
3 and three of degree 4, for an overall encoding power of 28 messages. Notice that
the space of messages is again equal to the example given in [12].
Choosing polynomials of degree 3 and 4 instead of 5 allows us to reduce the degree
of h(x), that is to say the number of bits that are needed to encrypt a message. So,
if we compute the information rate in this case we obtain a much better result:
(32) I = log2m
log2 c
=
8
23
∼= 34, 78%
which is slightly higher than the information rate presented in [12] for the same
message size.
The procedure works exactly the same when we change the ground field from
p = 2 to p = 3. This time we may choose three polynomials of degree 1, three of
degree 2 and two of degree 3, all monic and irreducible, allowing us to reduce the
overall degree of h(x) to deg(h(x)) = 16. In this case, for the same message size,
we get an information rate of
(33) I = 8
16 log2 3
∼= 31, 55%
which is not better than the information rate in [12], for a space of messages of the
same size, yet comparable.
3.2. Flexibility of the protocol. We have already pointed out in the previous
sections that the important condition (4) can be fulfilled in several different ways
according to the strategy we use in choosing the carrier polynomials pi’s. In what
follows we will present a strategy that optimises the information rate and one that,
to our analysys, improves security.
We will give a detailed analysis of the asymptotics of the information rate of our
protocol and of NSK, showing that they have the same behaviour. In what follows
our finite field k will be Fq for some prime power q.
3.2.1. Optimization of the information rate. The optimization of the information
rate is ensured by the following:
Proposition 4. There exists a strategy that maximises the information rate I for
any choice of q and L. Moreover, in this strategy the information rate is determined
Advances in Mathematics of Communications Volume 8, No. 3 (2014), 343–358
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by the closed formula
(34) I(q,N) =
N∑
n=1
1
n
∑
k|n
µ
(
n
k
)
qk(
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(
n
k
)
qk + 1
)
log2 q
where µ(x) is the Möbius function.
Proof. We defined the information rate to be I = L/(deg h log2 q) and we know
that the degree of h depends on the particular choice of carrier polynomials. The
strategy we will consider is simply given by choosing all irreducible polynomials
of all degrees up to a given degree N . Denote the number of degree-n irreducible
polynomials in Fq[x] by Dqn, we have the formula
Dqn =
1
n
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
)
qk
where µ(x) is the Möbius function. The overall number of chosen polynomials, that
is the number of bits that the plain text is composed by, as well as the sum of the
degrees of the pi’s are given by a closed formula, namely:
L =
N∑
n=1
Dqn =
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
) qk
n
(35)
deg(h(x)) =
N∑
n=1
nDqn + 1 =
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
)
qk + 1(36)
for some maximal degree N (which is dependent on L if we consider L to be the
fundamental parameter). Then, the information rate I as a function of the prime
power q and (implicitly) the parameter L has the desired closed expression.
It is easy to gather that such a choice of the polynomials guarantees maximal
information rate, in that we are lowering as much as possible the degree of h(x) and
as a result the number of bits of the encrypted message.
Remark 10. The obvious disadvantage of the strategy above is that one can al-
ways assume that the bare carrier polynomials are known, for we take all of them
progressively up to degree N. As a matter of fact, the strategy above gives us a
clear upper bound for the information rate, for all different combinations of L and
q. Notice, however, by comparison with the tables of [12], that this is the same
strategy adopted by Naccache and Stern, where the chosen prime p has the same
size of NextPrime(
∏
pi).
Within this strategy it is important to notice that all the variations proposed in
[12, Section 2.3] are importable in the present context. For example, it is possible
to express the message m in a basis different from 2, and this would lead to some
modification to the suitable degrees for our carriers. Moreover, it is possible to
restrict the space of messages to constant-weight strings. This last choice increases
the information rate since it allows to lower the degree of h(x). In fact, if w is the
constant weight, the bound on the degree of h is:
deg h > wN
where N is the highest degree of the chosen carriers.
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L (bits) deg h (bits) I
131 1024 12,8 %
233 2048 11,4%
418 4096 11,2%
Table 1. Information rate matching with [12, Section 2.2]
L (bits) M (bits) Size of p & deg h (bits) I
759 758 8192 11,4%
Table 2. Extension to next block and matching of the information rate
Apart from these extensions, the standard NSK protocol is summarized in the
table presented in [12, Section 2.2], where the information rate for 512, 1024 and
2048 bits-sized p’s is given. The strategy we have just outlined to reach the maximal
information rate, allows us to obtain the exact values presented in [12] matching
the degree of our polynomial h with the size of their prime p and L with the size
M of the message. So we are able to obtain the same information rate.
The matching procedure works as follows: compute the degree of h obtained by
choosing all polynomials up to a given degree, say 9 to obtain deg h = 977. Then,
top it to the next block, in this case 1024 bits, choosing some polynomials of one
degree higher, in this case 11. This leads to an increase in the number L of carrier
polynomials from 127 to 131, and the information rate is then given by the ratio
L/deg h.
In Table 1 we show how to match the examples presented in [12], and the last
row is obtained by extending their calculations to 4096 bits. If we go further and
compute the relevant figures in the case of 8192 bits we find almost perfect agreement
also in this case (cf. Table 2). It will be clear in what follows why this happens.
3.2.2. Asymptotics comparison with previous works. We will prove in this section
that our protocol has the same asymptotic information rate of [12]. A naive expla-
nation of this fact is given by arguing that the number of primes below a certain
number of bits has the same behaviour as the number of irreducible polynomials in
Fq[x] below a certain degree.
Let us fix the notation
aN ∼ bN ⇐⇒ lim
N→∞
aN
bN
= 1.
We will make use of the following
Lemma 5.
(37)
N∑
n=1
Dqn ∼
q
q − 1D
q
N
Proof. First recall that [16, Theorem 2.2] Dqn ∼ q
n
n and therefore the sums behave
asymptotically as
N∑
n=1
Dqn ∼
N∑
n=1
qn
n . Then we have (37) if and only if
(38) lim
N→∞
N∑
n=1
qn
n
qN
N
=
q
q − 1 .
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Now, denote by SN :=
N∑
n=1
N
n q
n−N and observe that it might be expressed in terms
of the recursive sequence
(39) SN+1 =
1
q
N + 1
N
SN + 1.
for the initial value S1 = 1. Consider S− = lim infN→∞ SN and S+ = lim sup
N→∞
SN .
Passing to the lim sup and lim inf in (39) we get the same equation for S±:
S± =
S±
q
+ 1
provided that they are both finite. Assuming that they are, we conclude that
(40) lim
N→∞
SN = S± =
q
q − 1
This assumption is legitimate since SN ≥ 0 for all N ∈ N, thus S− ≥ 0, and for
S+ we observe that
• When x ∈ R+ we have that qxx is increasing for x ≥ 1log q ≥ 2, since q ≥ 2, and
in particular this is true for x ∈ N∗;
• lim supN→∞ NqN
N∑
n=1
qn
n = lim supN→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=2
qn
n .
It follows that
lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=1
qn
n
= lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=2
qn
n
≤ lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
∫ N+1
2
qx
x
dx
where the last inequality comes from the fact that
N∑
n=2
qn
n are the lower sums of∫ N+1
2
qx
x dx, since
qx
x is increasing for x ≥ 2. Moreover
lim
N→∞
∫ N+1
2
qx
x dx
qN
N
= lim
t→∞
∫ t+1
2
qx
x dx
qt
t
= lim
t→∞
qt+1
t+1
qt
t (log q − 1t )
=
q
log q
where the second equality follows from the De L’Hôpital rule. This proves that
0 ≤ lim inf
N→∞
SN ≤ lim sup
N→∞
SN ≤ q
log q
and yields the claim.
We are now ready to prove
Proposition 6.
(41) I(q,N) ∼ 1
log2 q
1
N
Proof. Observe that nDqn ∼ qn and therefore, from (34)
I(q,N) ∼
( N∑
n=1
qn
n
)/(
log2 q
N∑
n=1
qn
)
Now, it is easy to gather that
(42)
N∑
n=1
qn ∼ q
q − 1q
N
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then, plugging the results of (42) and of Lemma 5 into (34), we obtain
(43) I(q,N) ∼ 1
log2 q
q
q−1
qN
N
q
q−1q
N
=
1
log2 q
1
N
.
We would like to compare this result with the information rate of the NSK
protocol. Notice that in order to make a consistent comparison we must understand
the role of our parameter N in the NSK.
Once q is fixed, bounding the degree of the carrier polynomials by N is the same
as bounding the number of bits required to represent any of them by the quantity
M = bN log2(q)c.
The analogous bound for the NSK is then given by bounding the number of bits of
the prime carriers byM . This is the same as bounding the prime carriers themselves
by 2M ' qN . In the following proposition the comparison is made explicit.
Proposition 7. Let N be the bound on the degree of the carrier polynomials and
M = bN log2(q)c the analogous bound for the bits of the prime carriers in the NSK.
The information rate for the NSK protocol is asymptotically given by
(44) INSK ∼ 1
log2 q
1
N
.
Proof. It is known [4, Equation 2] that for large m ∈ N∏
p<m
p ∼ em.
Let us consider m = 2M ' qN , then ∏p<qN p ∼ exp qN . Now, the number of prime
numbers up to qN asymptotically goes, by the prime number theorem, as
pi(qN ) ∼ q
N
N ln q
.
In our case this will be the number of carrier prime numbers up to qN . On the
other hand exp qN , which is the size of the prime modulus of [12], has
⌊
qN log2 e
⌋
digits, and therefore the information rate is computed as
(45) INSK ∼
qN
N ln q
qN log2 e
=
1
log2 q
1
N
.
By comparing Propositions 6 and 7 it is now clear that the two information rates
have the same behaviour. This explains that the matching procedure we perform
at the end of the previous section will attain the information rate of NSK also in
the asymptotic limit. Moreover it justifies the claim on the large-N behaviour of
irreducible polynomials with respect to prime numbers.
3.2.3. Some precautions to avoid subgroup-like attacks. The security of this protocol
is strictly related to the size of the degree of h and, as a consequence, to the range
of degrees that the carriers can have. Indeed, when the carriers are chosen within
a large set, the attacker will not have chances (in terms of a brute force attack) to
find the pi’s to set up a discrete logarithm problem for the pair (pi, psi ) for any i.
As a matter of fact, the knowledge of h will only lead to the following information
on the degrees:
deg(h) =
∑
i
deg(pi) + 1.
Advances in Mathematics of Communications Volume 8, No. 3 (2014), 343–358
356 Giacomo Micheli and Michele Schiavina
This is not the case when working with integers and primes in Z/pZ, where we can
always assume that the prime factors are known when p '∏i pi.
We first sketch a subgroup like attack in the most unsafe case. Let G be an
abelian group and pv1, . . . , pvL be carriers, as in Section 3. Let the order of p
v
i in G
be ni and suppose gcd (ni, nj) = 1 for i 6= j. Let now
Mj = n1 · · ·nj−1 · nj+1 · · ·nL.
It is easy to observe that, for a generic cyphertext c, mj = 1 if and only if cMj 6= 1.
As it is elementary to observe, this leads to decryption in L steps. Moreover, it
can also be adapted to work when the condition gcd (ni, nj) = 1 is just partially
fulfilled. In this case, indeed, only partial information on the text can be extracted.
Consider now the decomposition in cyclic subgroups of the multiplicative group
of the finite field (Fqd)∗. In order to avoid subgroup-like attacks on the cyphertext
we will require all the pi’s to be generators of the same subgroup of large order.
This will lead to certain requirements on qd − 1.
The most natural choice to solve this problem is asking that the degree d of the
reducing polynomial h(x) be constrained by the following:
(46) r :=
qd − 1
q − 1 is prime.
Now one could choose the pi’s such that
(47) pi(x)r 6= 1 mod h(x) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
3.3. “Chinese remainder” version. In what follows we will present another ex-
ample of a protocol that fits the general picture, which stems on the well known
chinese remainder theorem. To do this, let us introduce a large prime power q
and a natural number L ∈ N. Consider now the monoid S = (FL+1q )∗, with the
multiplication defined componentwise, and the set R = {r1, . . . , rL+1} ⊆ Fq.
Let αi ∈ Fq\R ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and choose two large integers u, v such that
uv = 1 mod (q − 1). Compute the following list of vectors pi ∈ (FL+1q )∗ as
(gi)j := (rj − αi)
(pi)j := (gi)
v.
Let
((FL+1q )∗, {p1, . . . , pL})
be the public key and
({g1, . . . , gL}, {r1 . . . rL})
be the secret key. Let
F : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
pmii
be the encryption map.
Remark 11. Observe that the information rate is
L
(L+ 1) log2(q)
.
Proposition 8. F is an injection.
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Proof. We define a polynomial on Fq[x] by
hR(x) :=
L+1∏
i=1
(x− ri)
whose set of zeros coincide with R. We will prove the proposition by showing how
to compute the inverse over the image of F using h(x), i.e. we will show how to
uniquely decrypt any cyphertext c ∈ =(F ) using the secret key. Let
ψ : S −→ S
x 7→ xv,
G : Fq[x]/hR(x)
CRT−→ FLq
k(x) 7→ (k(r1), . . . , k(rL)),
and
Γ : Fq[x]/hR(x) −→ Fq[x]
be the canonical lift. The decryption map D is given by checking Γ(G−1(ψ−1(x)))
modulo gi(x) = (x− αi): whenever it is zero it means mi = 1, where ψ−1(x) = xu.
Observe that the decryption is well defined: the map
αψ∼ : ZL2 −→ Fq[x]/(hR(x))
is clearly injective (and then α∼ is, by Proposition 1) since the product of all the
gi(x) has degree L < L+ 1. Observe that ∼ is as usual the relation induced by the
ideal of hR(x).
4. Outlook and further research
In the present communication we have given a new setting to produce many
examples of knapsack encryption schemes, showing also how a remarkable example
such as [12] perfectly fits our framework. We have proposed a next-to-simplest
example when the monoid is chosen to be (k[x], ·), one realization of which is given
by Fq[x] reduced by the ideal of an irreducible polynomial of suitable degree.
This brand new application of the knapsack idea reproduces the key results pre-
sented in [12] in terms of information rate, but allows us to improve some important
features such as
• the information rate is shown to be deterministic by providing an exact for-
mula for it (cf. [12, Section 2.2]).
• it reduces the computations over Fqd with p ∼ qd but q  p, where Fq is a
field of small characteristic.
A non trivial variation of this scheme has been found, by taking into account
a polynomial which splits over the base field and applying the chinese remainder
theorem, allowing the computations to be performed over a direct sum of fields.
In [12] Naccache and Stern conjectured that it might be possible to elliptic curve
their scheme, and the new general framework we have presented might be of some
help to address this problem.
Moreover, it would be interesting to see how the recent improvements to the
NSK protocol presented in [1] may apply to our polynomial instance. This will be
matter of further studies.
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